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Antitrust agencies around the world are increasingly focusing on digital indus-
tries. Critics have justifiably questioned the ability of competition agencies to make 
beneficial enforcement decisions given the complexity and rapid pace of change in 
online markets. This Article discusses those criticisms and addresses the argument 
that, because the error costs of overenforcement of antitrust laws in digital markets 
would be much higher than the error costs of underenforcement, courts and antitrust 
agencies should presume against antitrust intervention in digital industries. While 
acknowledging that there is often good reason for such modesty in enforcement, this 
Article discusses several ways in which competition policy can adjust to better 
account for potential costs and benefits of enforcement in digital platform markets. It 
argues that nonprice effects related to information and innovation are particularly 
important to the performance of online platforms, and may hold the key to a better 
understanding of the costs of antitrust underenforcement and the assessment of the 
competitive effects of conduct and transactions in digital industries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The enforcement of competition and consumer protection laws has fo-
cused increasingly on industries related to digital content and the Internet. 
The landmark cases against Microsoft over a decade ago were just the 
beginning;1 more recent investigations have addressed conduct by Google,2 
the merger of digital music giants EMI and Universal,3 Comcast’s acquisition 
of NBC-Universal,4 the alleged e-books conspiracy by Apple and others,5 
 
1 United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft II), 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
2 See Press Release, FTC, Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve FTC 
Competition Concerns in the Markets for Devices Like Smart Phones, Games and Tablets, and in 
Online Search ( Jan. 3, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/01/google.shtm. 
3 See Press Release, FTC, FTC Closes Its Investigation into Vivendi, S.A.’s Proposed Acquisi-
tion of EMI Recorded Music (Sept. 21, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/09/emi.shtm.  
4 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Allows Comcast-NBCU Joint 
Venture to Proceed with Conditions ( Jan. 18, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/ 
January/11-at-061.html. 
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privacy and data security violations by Facebook and Twitter,6 IP portfolio 
acquisitions,7 and many other matters. The enforcement agencies’ principal 
antitrust concern is with digital markets that are, or may become, dominated 
by firms that maintain their market power through anticompetitive conduct 
and acquisitions.8 This concern has been particularly salient for firms that 
serve as digital “platforms.”  
There is no consensus on exactly what constitutes a digital platform, 
although there are common elements to the definitions that commentators 
have offered. One early effort to describe a digital platform called it “inter-
mediation activity linked with the ‘assembly’ of content and services onto a 
coherent technical and commercial access platform.”9 A more recent popular 
definition describes “an audience-centric platform across different media 
and various business functions.”10 David Evans describes platforms as 
entities that provide software and services on which other businesses rely to 
produce complementary products.11 For purposes of this Article, I will 
define digital platforms as products or services through which end users and 
a wide variety of complementary products, services, or information (“appli-
cations”) can interact. Platforms therefore include devices (e.g., phones and 
tablets), software (e.g., operating systems and browsers), and services (e.g., 
search engines, social networks, and e-commerce sites). The common 
 
5 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Three 
of the Largest Book Publishers and Continues to Litigate Against Apple Inc. and Two Other 
Publishers to Restore Price Competition and Reduce E-book Prices (Apr. 11, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-at-457.html. 
6 See Press Release, FTC, Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived Consumers by 
Failing to Keep Privacy Promises (Nov. 29, 2011), available at http://ftc.gov/opa/2011/11/privacy 
settlement.shtm; Press Release, FTC, FTC Accepts Final Settlement with Twitter for Failure to 
Safeguard Personal Information (Mar. 11, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/03/ 
twitter.shtm. 
7 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust 
Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigations of Google Inc.’s Acquisition of Motorola 
Mobility Holdings Inc. and the Acquisitions of Certain Patents by Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp. 
and Research in Motion Ltd. (Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/ 
February/12-at-210.html. 
8 See supra notes 1-7; see also Edward Wyatt & Claire Kaine Miller, Citing Logistics, F.T.C. 
Pushes Antitrust Inquiry Against Google Into January, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/12/20/technology/ftc-pushes-antitrust-inquiry-against-google-into-january.html (discussing the 
FTC’s concerns over Google’s maintenance of market power).  
9 Laurence Meyer, Digital Platforms: Definition and Strategic Value, COMM. & STRATEGIES, 2d 
Quarter 2000, at 127, 128 (2000) ( footnote omitted). 
10 Integrated Digital Platforms, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_digital_ 
platform (last updated Feb. 15, 2013). 
11 David S. Evans, Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet Economy, 102 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1987, 1989 (2008). 
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thread, in keeping with the other definitions cited above, is that the plat-
form provides a gateway between consumers and many diverse applications 
well beyond the specific product or service that constitutes the platform 
itself. Platforms serve to expand and aggregate functionality and to enhance 
consumers’ access to the aggregated applications. In addition, they serve as 
“enablers” of innovation by providing common interfaces through which 
entrepreneurs can connect their complementary products to critical masses 
of consumers.12  
The rapid pace of change in the technology and economic structure of 
the Internet and associated markets raises an important question for 
competition policy: whether antitrust enforcement in digital industries can 
protect consumers without “causing harm from interfering in complex 
businesses that are both rapidly moving and not fully understood.”13 One 
prominent set of commentators offers a strongly negative answer and argues 
that competition enforcement is likely to make costly errors when exercised 
in digital platform markets.14 
Some who argue against antitrust enforcement in digital industries do so 
based on an unreflective claim that enforcement can never do anything but 
get in the way of beneficial economic conduct. Some more thoughtful and 
knowledgeable commentators criticize antitrust on grounds of the compara-
tive economic costs of overenforcement and underenforcement errors: 
because digital platform markets have characteristics that make it particularly 
difficult for antitrust authorities to assess the effects of conduct in those 
markets, the likelihood of overenforcement is high.15 Moreover, the argument 
continues, the cost of such errors is high because overenforcement could 
deter investment and innovation and therefore have substantial, lasting 
consequences for economic welfare. In contrast, underenforcement will 
more likely lead to short-term harm that the market will correct as firms 
 
12 See Tim Wu, Taking Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement If Innovation Mattered Most, 
78 ANTITRUST L.J. 313, 321 (2012) (“Platforms are critical to innovation because . . . they vastly 
cheapen market entry for a large number of firms (the developers), creating ultra-low-cost market 
entry. The platform owner, in effect, tees up the market for everyone else, providing both the tools 
and distribution necessary to reach customers.”). 
13 Evans, supra note 11, at 1989. 
14 See generally Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The 
Case Against the Case Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 244 (2011) (arguing that 
antitrust law should be applied cautiously against Google, because “a false positive” would chill 
Google’s “innovation and competition” that is “currently providing immense benefits to consumers”); 
David McGowan, Between Logic and Experience: Error Costs and United States v. Microsoft Corp., 
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1185, 1189-90 (2005) (relying on Microsoft II to argue that—at least in 
new markets—a “mistaken condemnation of competitive conduct is costlier than mistaken 
acquittals of anticompetitive conduct”). 
15 See, e.g., Manne & Wright, supra note 14, at 188-89. 
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innovate and compete for their chance to reap the rewards of temporary 
dominance. Taking the high likelihood that antitrust authorities will make 
mistakes of overenforcement together with the relatively high costs of those 
errors, those who espouse the error-cost analysis argue for calibrating 
antitrust policy to favor underenforcement errors instead of overenforcement 
errors in digital platform markets.16 
At the heart of the critiques of antitrust enforcement in digital indus-
tries is the mismatch between the conventional, price-oriented antitrust 
framework and the more innovation-based competition that characterizes 
markets for digital goods and services. Fast changing markets, such as those 
related to the Internet, might be hard to define and less subject to the 
structural presumptions of conventional antitrust analysis. More fundamen-
tally, the usual price-oriented antitrust analysis may be irrelevant in markets 
where many consumers pay nothing for the services they use and in which 
firms compete more through technological advancements than through 
lower prices.  
Both of the above criticisms have some merit. The critics of enforcement 
are right that market definition and structural presumptions are less rele-
vant in fast changing markets and that it is important for antitrust analysis 
to adjust to the innovation-based competition that occurs in such markets.17 
But those observations do not suffice to sustain the error-cost argument 
against enforcement for two reasons: First, antitrust enforcement has 
steadily moved away from reliance on market definition and structural 
presumptions even in “conventional” markets. Enforcement has also moved 
beyond static efficiency to focus on innovation effects. Second, digital 
platforms raise competitive concerns related to innovation and customer 
information that may warrant increased antitrust scrutiny of their conduct 
and merger activity. So, even if some aspects of digital industries render 
competition enforcement less appropriate, other aspects might make it quite 
important.  
This Article examines the error cost arguments in light of several im-
portant characteristics of digital platforms and their market environment. It 
agrees that competition enforcement in the digital world requires particular 
caution on the part of antitrust agencies and courts. Nevertheless, it finds that 
the features that distinguish digital platforms from firms in “conventional” 
 
16 See McGowan, supra note 14, at 1190-91 (describing three reasons advanced by Judge 
Easterbrook to accept that a high risk of error counsels underenforcement (citing Frank H. 
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, at 15-16 (1984))). 
17 See Manne & Wright, supra note 14, at 220-23 (describing the difficulties of defining 
Google’s market). 
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industries do not all weigh in favor of biasing policy toward underenforce-
ment, the social costs of which could be at least as high as those of overen-
forcement. This Article therefore argues that competition policy for digital 
platforms should start with caution in its application of existing tools but 
should not end there. Competition policy should also examine the ways in 
which conventional competition analysis as applied to digital platforms falls 
short in an effort to better adapt to the economic environment of the 
Internet. The challenge for competition policy is to identify the characteris-
tics that differentiate competition on the Internet from competition as 
conventionally conceived in antitrust law, and to determine if, and how, 
those differences translate into differences in antitrust enforcement. While 
this adaptation to digital platforms might sometimes take the form of less 
aggressive antitrust intervention, it might also take the form of new empha-
ses, approaches, and remedies.  
Further, this Article examines several directions in which competition 
policy might adjust to better account for the potential costs and benefits by 
better assessing the risks of enforcement in digital platform markets. Part I 
further describes the error-cost argument and its rationale. Part II examines 
several defining characteristics of digital platforms, including the importance 
of customer information and innovation, and discusses how those character-
istics can affect competition and business conduct on the Internet. Part III 
discusses how competition enforcement might shift focus to issues related 
to customer information and innovation in order to better address the 
particular environment of the Internet. It explains how antitrust enforcement 
in digital industries can build on ongoing policy developments that diminish 
the need to rely on a market definition and that allow innovation effects a 
more prominent place in competition analysis. Finally, Part IV summarizes 
and offers several conclusions.  
I. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND ERROR COSTS 
There is much at stake in designing good competition policy for digital 
platform markets. Anticompetitive actions that preserve monopoly bottle-
necks and exclude rivals will leave consumers and complementary product 
suppliers worse off. On the other hand, aggressive competition and innova-
tion will bring consumers the benefits of new services and better terms. The 
key challenge for antitrust enforcers is to distinguish the bad anti-
competitive acts from the aggressive but procompetitive acts.  
Commentators have mainly given two reasons why this challenge is 
greater for digital platforms than for conventional types of markets. First, 
they argue that defining markets and making inferences about competition 
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based on market structure is much more difficult for digital goods and 
services,18 and posit that antitrust intervention based on such inferences 
may be unwarranted or counterproductive. Second, competition on the 
Internet is very often competition for the whole market through innovation, 
rather than competition for a share of the market through pricing.19 Pressure 
on a dominant incumbent comes from rivals innovating to supplant the 
incumbent over time rather than from current competitors trying to chip 
away at the incumbent’s market share at a given point in time; competition is 
thus more sequential than simultaneous.20 Antitrust enforcement based on a 
static view of market dominance runs the risk of missing the real source of 
competitive pressure on apparent monopolists and reducing the rewards for 
innovation by potential rivals. Proponents of this view conclude that the 
costs of overenforcement errors are sufficiently high that society should 
prefer errors of antitrust underenforcement in digital platform markets. 
The error cost critique questions the relevance of the conventional anti-
trust framework in markets characterized by rapid technological change and 
in which prices are less important to consumers or to competitive strategy 
than are new products and capabilities. Conventional antitrust analysis 
focuses on the relationship between firms’ conduct and market performance, 
as measured through prices and output levels of relevant products and 
services. Thus, merger enforcement under section 7 of the Clayton Act 
looks at markets in which a controlling firm could impose a “SSNIP,” a 
“small but significant non-transitory increase in price.”21 Collusion cases 
under section 1 of the Sherman Act hinge on the extent to which the joint 
activity of rivals is likely to restrain normal price competition.22 And 
 
18 Id. 
19 Cf. id. at 183-84 (explaining that “economists generally know much less about the relationship 
between competition, innovation, and consumer welfare than they do about standard price 
competition”). 
20 Cf. P.A. Geroski, Competition in Markets and Competition for Markets, 3 J. INDUSTRY, COM-
PETITION & TRADE 151, 159 (2003) (arguing that the “main difficulty” with the traditional test for 
identifying market boundaries is that “it may not provide very reliable information on competitors 
who could launch a challenge for the market”); Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, 
“Schumpeterian” Competition and Antitrust Policy in High-Tech Markets, COMPETITION, Fall/Winter 
2005, at 47, 49 (explaining that “[a]t the heart of the Schumpeterian argument is the assertion that, 
in important instances, competition primarily occurs through cycles of innovation, rather than 
through static price or output competition,” and that in such instances firms compete “sequentially 
for the market as a whole”). 
21 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4.1.1 (2010), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES]. 
22 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS 
AMONG COMPETITORS § 1.2 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf 
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monopolization cases under section 2 of the Sherman Act begin with proof 
of the element of monopoly power—essentially, the ability of the defendant 
to impose price increases on its customers.23 In all of the above examples, 
antitrust law defines consumer welfare in terms of the prices and outputs of 
a given product.  
Nonprice considerations are not absent from conventional antitrust 
analysis; concerns about how transactions or competitive strategies might 
affect innovation, product variety, or the availability of critical goods or 
services have factored into antitrust enforcement.24 Innovation, in particular, 
has become an increasingly important focus—mostly in merger review, but 
also in conduct cases—over the past twenty-five years.25 But such nonprice 
concerns have generally remained secondary to modern antitrust law’s 
primary emphasis on price effects and static efficiency.26 
The error-cost critique of applying the conventional, price-oriented 
framework to technologically dynamic markets is two-fold. First, the 
structure of such markets at any point in time is likely to be in transition, so 
the elements of the competitive environment on which antitrust authorities 
base their decision to investigate are likely to become increasingly outdated 
and irrelevant as the investigation proceeds. What appear to be harmful 
effects at one moment may vanish the next, rendering any gains from 
enforcement minimal at best.27 Second, temporary dominance is the prize 
for which firms in “dynamic” markets compete, so enforcement that limits 
firms’ ability to achieve or profit from that dominance will have the counter-
 
(“The central question is whether the relevant agreement likely harms competition by increasing the 
ability or incentive . . . to raise price[s] . . . .”). 
23 See Herbert Hovenkamp, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
AND ITS PRACTICE § 3.9b (3d ed. 2005) (“[T]he presence of persistent price discrimination is 
evidence that a seller has marker power . . . .”). 
24 See, e.g., Microsoft II, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, 
supra note 21. 
25 See Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 
1, 1 (2007) (discussing the dramatic increase in policymakers’ concern with fostering innovation 
within the context of merger enforcement during the 1980s and 1990s). 
26 See Richard Gilbert & Willard K. Tom, Is Innovation King at the Antitrust Agencies? The 
Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later, 69 ANTITRUST L. J. 43, 44 (2001) (“We conclude 
that innovation is not quite ‘King’ at the antitrust agencies, although its role has become increas-
ingly important and has been decisive in several merger and non-merger enforcement actions that 
have potentially very significant impacts for consumer welfare.”). 
27 Katz & Shelanski, supra note 20, at 52 (“[I]n the Schumpeterian view of the world, any 
profits and associated welfare losses due to unilateral practices or a merger are transitory . . . .”). 
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productive effect of slowing innovation to the detriment of economic 
growth and consumer welfare.28  
Taken together, these two observations lead proponents of the error-cost 
analysis to conclude that antitrust in technologically dynamic markets is 
likely to do more harm than good. Put differently, the error-cost argument 
implies that even when enforcement correctly identifies anticompetitive 
conduct in digital markets, it is likely to do little good because the effects of 
such harmful conduct will be short lived. When enforcement misses the 
mark, however, it is likely to cause enduring harm by deterring innovation 
that would have been of great social value. Because the costs of over-
enforcement exceed the costs of underenforcement, proponents of this theory 
recommend calibrating antitrust enforcement to prefer underenforcement.  
A. Cautionary Tales 
Regulation and antitrust both supply cautionary tales about the con-
sequences of intervention in markets undergoing technological change. A 
regulatory example is the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which Congress 
enacted to open local telephone monopolies to competition.29 The Act 
required incumbent telephone carriers to provide new entrants with access 
to established landline networks at cost-based rates.30  
Within a decade of Congress’s enactment of the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, however, the local competition provisions of the statute had 
become an afterthought.31 The 1996 Act’s central flaw was that it embodied 
too static a view of the market for “local” communications and did not take 
account of, or anticipate, imminent shifts in technology and consumer 
demand that made landline voice secondary to various kinds of mobile and 
broadband communications. The combined result of these shifts was that, 
 
28 Geroski, supra note 20, at 152-54, 166 (arguing that in certain markets, mainly high-tech 
markets, firms compete to set the “standard” of the market, and that this competition may 
incentivize innovation). 
29 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
30 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2) (charging incumbent local exchange carriers with the “duty to 
provide, for the facilities and equipment of any requesting telecommunications carrier, intercon-
nection with the local exchange carrier’s network . . . on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, 
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory”). 
31 It had in fact become apparent reasonably soon after the 1996 Act’s initial implementation 
that its competitive access provisions would become irrelevant. See Howard A. Shelanski, A 
Comment on Competition and Controversy in Local Telecommunications, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1617, 1631 
(1999) (“Although many of the 1996 Act’s local competition provisions address competitors’ access 
to incumbent carriers’ networks and services, such provisions are irrelevant to a sizable proportion 
of local competition.”).  
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only a few years after Congress passed the 1996 Act, its central provisions 
regarding local voice communications were obsolete. And it was not because 
the law had achieved its intended effect and launched a competitive local 
exchange market, but because innovations in technology and changes in 
consumer demand quickly bypassed the economic and technological as-
sumptions underlying the statute’s local competition provisions.32 
The FTC’s 2010 review of Google’s acquisition of AdMob is another 
cautionary tale.33 Mobile advertising networks place advertisements on 
applications for mobile platforms like Android devices and, most notably at 
the time, Apple’s iPhone, which was then the dominant mobile platform. At 
the time, AdMob was, by most measures, the leading mobile advertising 
network and Google was a significant and particularly fast-growing rival.34 
Initially, the FTC was concerned that the merger would inhibit future 
competition in the terms that mobile ad networks offered to advertisers and 
applications developers, and that Google would reduce its R&D in mobile 
advertising once it had AdMob’s technology.35 The FTC also found evi-
dence that the merger might harm competition because the parties had 
viewed each other as primary competitors.36  
However, late in the investigation, Apple announced plans for mobile 
advertising on the iPhone platform that changed assumptions about the 
mobile advertising marketplace.37 Apple had not only deployed its own 
mobile ad network, but also announced rules for Apple application developers 
that would make unavailable to third-party mobile ad networks key ad-
vantages that would be available to Apple’s proprietary mobile advertising 
service.38 Those rules would significantly limit third-party mobile ad 
services on the iPhone platform. This suddenly emerging set of circum-
stances made the merging firms’ current market positions and historic 
trajectories poor predictors of their future competitive significance. The 
FTC thus changed course, closed its investigation, and allowed Google to 
acquire AdMob.39 Had Apple announced its own mobile advertising plans 
 
32 See generally Howard Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a New Model for 
U.S. Telecommunications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55 (2007). 
33 Google/AdMob, No. 101-0031 (FTC May 21, 2010) (statement of the Commission), availa-
ble at http://ftc.gov/os/closings/100521google-admobstmt.pdf. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
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just months later, the course of the merger investigation might have been 
very different. 
B. Policy Responses to “Dynamic” Markets 
While examples like Google’s acquisition of AdMob counsel caution 
when defining relevant markets during periods of rapid technological 
change, antitrust law has become less static in two significant ways. First, 
while market definition remains very important, enforcement agencies have 
come to rely less on the exercise and its associated structural presump-
tions.40 Second, antitrust has increasingly focused on innovation—both in 
terms of how innovation affects market structures and how enforcement 
might affect firms’ incentives to invest in new technology.41 
1. Reduced Emphasis on Market Definition  
and Market Structure 
While there is no panacea for the difficulties of competition analysis in 
technologically dynamic markets, regulators can avoid the basic difficulties 
of market definition in many cases by focusing first, and more directly, on 
the competitive effects of conduct and transactions. Recent scholarship has 
been increasingly critical of the market definition exercise that underlies 
much competition enforcement,42 and the FTC and DOJ’s 2010 revised 
U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines demonstrate a retreat from formulaic 
reliance on market definition.43 The fundamental problem with an emphasis 
on market definition is that it diverts initial attention away from direct 
assessment of likely competitive effects—the key issue in merger analysis44—
 
40 See, e.g., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 21. 
41 See Katz & Shelanski, supra note 25, at 64 (introducing cases that involved innovation 
considerations).  
42 See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 476-79 (2010) 
(reviewing academic criticisms of the traditional market-definition exercise); Katz & Shelanski, supra 
note 25, at 14 (noting that the concentration-competition welfare presumption is subject to criticism). 
43 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 21, § 4 (asserting that “[s]ome of the 
analytical tools used by the Agencies to assess competitive effects do not rely on market definition”). 
44 See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974) (cautioning that 
information about competitive effects, not mere concentration data, was necessary for the 
government to prove a merger case); Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of 
Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition, B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON., 
Jan. 2010, no. 9, at 3-5, available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/alternative.pdf (arguing 
that the “presumption that a merger which substantially increases market concentration is likely to 
be anti-competitive” may be mistaken). 
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and starts the analysis with a very indirect means of gauging post-merger 
market performance. 
Because the facts and available evidence vary, there is no single formula 
for an effects-based analysis of conduct or mergers. In most conduct cases, it 
is easier than in merger cases to look directly at effects because the allegedly 
anticompetitive acts will have already occurred for some period of time. In 
merger investigations, where the effects analysis is more prospective, 
evidence of likely effects may be less obvious but still available. For exam-
ple, evidence from past mergers, from past price changes by the merging 
parties, and from the parties’ respective bidding and win–loss records can 
help enforcement agencies to understand the extent to which the merging 
parties compete with themselves and with other firms.45 Comparison of 
markets in which the firms compete head-to-head with markets in which 
only one of the firms operates may also provide important insight into the 
merging parties’ competitive importance to each other. This latter analysis 
served as the basis for the FTC’s successful challenge to the proposed 
Staples/Office Depot merger in 1997. There, the FTC was able to show that 
prices for office supplies were lower in geographic areas where two office 
superstores competed than in local markets with just one superstore.46 The 
point is that enforcement decisions based on direct evidence of effects may 
be more accurate than decisions based on less direct evidence from which 
effects might be inferred.  
2. Increased Emphasis on Innovation 
Antitrust authorities and scholars have long maintained that innovation 
is more important to economic growth and social welfare than price compe-
tition among existing products.47 But there is somewhat less consensus on 
whether antitrust enforcement is at odds with such innovation.48 One noted 
school of thought, often called the “Schumpeterian School” after the 
 
45 See, e.g., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 21, § 2 (noting that the agencies 
will “consider any reasonably available and reliable evidence” regarding the competitive effects of 
proposed mergers). 
46 See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1077-78 (D.D.C. 1997) (observing that “evidence 
show[ed] that the defendants change[d] their price zones when faced with entry of another 
superstore”).  
47 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 
74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 601 (2007) (“[A]n antitrust enforcement program crafted to promote 
innovation would attack direct reductions in innovation competition . . . .”).  
48 Compare id. at 589 (asserting that contemporary competition policy’s focus on enforcement 
effectively promotes innovation), with McGowan, supra note 14, at 1200 (arguing that government 
enforcement of antitrust policies has offered negligible social utility). 
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economist Josef Schumpeter, argues that competition in some markets 
occurs through dynamic cycles of technological change and innovation 
rather than through static price competition.49 It further argues that anti-
trust enforcement based on conventional notions of competition will miss 
the importance of, and perhaps interfere with, cycles of innovation in a 
relevant market.50 Antitrust authorities or courts might discourage innova-
tion by impeding the possibility of monopoly returns that induces firms to 
engage in risky research and development in the first place.  
Antitrust enforcement agencies have increasingly taken into account 
how enforcement might affect innovation and how, in turn, innovation 
might affect the economic assumptions underlying a particular enforcement 
action. In the 1990s, the agencies began to factor innovation more expressly 
into merger analysis.51 More recently, the FTC’s investigations of Google 
and Intel focused in large part on how the conduct of those firms would 
affect the introduction of competing technology into the marketplace.52 And 
the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines expressly refer to innovation as a 
central concern.53 The important point is that antitrust enforcement has 
adopted an increasingly dynamic perspective that, like the reduced emphasis 
on market definition and structural presumptions, is better suited to digital 
industries than is the static framework. 
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF DIGITAL PLATFORMS 
The commercial Internet is still a relatively recent phenomenon. The 
Internet initially became available for private commercial use in 1991 but 
took several years to become integrated into daily life.54 Several of the most 
important digital platforms like Facebook and Twitter are less than ten 
years old, and even “established” players like Google, Yahoo, and Amazon 
 
49 Katz & Shelanski, supra note 20, at 49. 
50 Id. at 49-50. 
51 See Katz & Shelanski, supra note 25, at 67-69 (discussing developments in the 1990s). 
52 See Motorola Mobility LLC & Google Inc., 78 Fed. Reg. 3427 (FTC Jan. 16, 2013) (pro-
posed consent agreement), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130103googlemotorola 
stmtofcomm.pdf (defending its criticized settlement with Google as helping to ensure that 
consumers will “continue to see the benefits of competition and innovation in important technology 
markets”); Press Release, FTC, FTC Settles Charges of Anticompetitive Conduct Against Intel 
(Aug. 4, 2010), available at http://ftc.gov/opa/2010/08/intel.shtm (asserting that the settlement will 
allow Intel to “innovate and offer competitive pricing”). 
53 See, e.g., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 21, at § 6.4. 
54 The U.S. Government opened the Internet for commercial use and established the Na-
tional Research and Education Network through the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-194, 105 Stat. 1594 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 5501–5528 (2006)).  
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have not been around for much longer than that. Significant new firms are 
coming online every year, and new and established digital businesses are 
continuously introducing new technologies and services. Digital platforms 
are young and evolving, as are their consumers’ preferences and usage 
patterns. Some digital platforms have become (at least for some period) 
large and possibly dominant, while others struggle for a foothold in the 
market. Notably, when platforms do possess market power, they have several 
characteristics that present competitive concerns of greater complexity and 
ambiguity than those related to other kinds of goods and services.  
A. Amplification of Market Power 
Suppose a particular device like a smartphone has become dominant 
because it provides some unique features. To the extent the device is a 
gateway to complementary applications, the device producer can extract 
profits not only from what the device can do itself, but also from the 
applications to which the device provides access. While the device manufac-
turer has to operate in a two-sided market and set prices to attract both 
users and complementary application providers, it can use its dominance to 
extract profits from both sides—profits that may grow with the number of 
subscribers and applications providers. Put simply, a bottleneck to every-
thing can potentially take a share of, and exercise some control over, every-
thing. While a typical monopolist controls its own products and services, a 
typical bottleneck monopolist both controls access to its own service and 
can affect access to some number of other products and services.55 Thus, a 
digital platform monopolist controls its own product or service as well as 
access to a much broader universe of products or services; it affects the 
decisions of a much broader universe of users.56 As one set of authors puts 
it, perhaps a bit overdramatically, “Google has become the main interface 
for our whole reality.”57 A platform’s potential amplification of market power 
may differ more in degree than in kind from the levering power of a 
conventional bottleneck gatekeeper, but that difference can be substantial. 
The potential problem is captured by another description of Google in the 
trade press: 
 
55 See STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 942-
43 (3d ed. 2012) (defining “bottleneck” monopolies). 
56 See infra Section II.B. 
57 H. MAURER ET AL., REPORT ON DANGERS AND OPPORTUNITIES POSED BY LARGE 
SEARCH ENGINES, PARTICULARLY GOOGLE 16 (2007), http://www.iicm.tugraz.at/iicm_papers/ 
dangers_google.pdf. 
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Google’s search engine is, well, not just a search engine. . . . [T]his de facto 
internet gateway is also a place where Google can deliver its own services to 
netizens across the globe. YouTube, Google Maps, Google Product Search, 
and any other Google service—as well as any service Google might build in 
future years—all have an obvious advantage over competitors.58  
Whether Google’s proprietary applications have an “obvious” advantage 
is debatable. Even putting aside possible bypass of Google through direct 
navigation or use of an “app” to reach a particular content or service provider, 
a firm’s incentives to discriminate against unaffiliated providers of comple-
mentary products are complex59—especially when that firm’s business model 
hinges largely on selling advertising to those complementary producers. But 
the key point about bottleneck discrimination is that of ability: Google’s 
scale and scope might appear to give it substantial power in a wide range of 
markets, even if Google would not use that power harmfully. 
B. Multisided Markets and Multiple Products 
Another central feature of a platform is that it interacts with more than 
one set of customers. Multisided markets are nothing new: conventional 
television broadcasters have for years been marketing programming to 
viewers, while also marketing those viewers to advertisers. Similarly, 
Internet service providers sell access to subscribers while also connecting 
those customers to upstream applications.60 Platforms therefore act as 
intermediaries between different sets of consumers that might need to reach 
each other but cannot do so as efficiently without the platform.61 These 
different groups of consumers are all users of the platform’s services and in 
turn relate to each other vertically as buyers and sellers. Platforms not only 
create a forum in which such market participants can connect with each 
other, they also provide scale and interfaces that raise the probability and 
efficiency of successful interactions.  
The multisided nature of digital platforms creates several consequences 
for competition policy. A platform cannot set prices for one market facet 
 
58 Cade Metz, We Probe the Google Antitrust Probe. Vigorously, REGISTER (Dec. 1, 2010), http:// 
www.theregister.co.uk/2010/12/01/google_eu_investigation_comment. 
59 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access 
Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
85, 97-100 (2003) (explaining the logic behind integration). 
60 See David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE J. ON 
REG. 325, 337 tbl.1 (2003) (providing examples of multisided markets).  
61 See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND J. 
ECON. 645, 645-46 (2006) (defining two-sided markets). 
  
1678 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 1663 
 
without affecting supply and demand on other sides of the market.62 Market 
power on one side of the market, therefore, does not necessarily enable the 
platform to impose monopoly prices on consumers in that market segment 
because such pricing might diminish the prices the platform can charge to 
its customers on other sides of the market.63 With major search and social 
networking platforms, consumers on one side of the market (end users) get 
the product for free while consumers on the other side (advertisers) pay. 
This feature can raise complicated issues for antitrust enforcement. What 
might appear to be dominance in the platform’s core product market (e.g., 
search or social networking) may only translate indirectly, if at all, into 
pricing power in the revenue-generating market (e.g., advertising). These 
problems are not intractable, but the interdependency of the different 
market sides of a platform can make it much harder to determine what the 
“relevant market”64 is for competition enforcement and what the competi-
tive effects of conduct or acquisitions might be. 
C. Customer Information as Critical Asset 
While customer information is perhaps always valuable for a business, it 
is even more so for digital platforms. There are two main reasons for this: 
(1) digital platforms generally have much greater access than conventional 
businesses to a broad range of information about their consumers, and (2) 
digital businesses may be better able to process and use that data for a 
variety of purposes.  
Any successful neighborhood merchant tries to ascertain the preferences 
of the local community and the tastes of repeat customers; such efforts 
tailor supply to demand while reducing transaction costs and waste. But 
even a large brick-and-mortar business gets a relatively narrow picture of its 
customers—likely limited to what customers have purchased from that 
particular business, how often they visit, what parts of the business they find 
appealing, their credit histories, and other personal data like the customers’ 
 
62 See id. at 664-65 (noting that in a two-sided market, “the platform can affect the volume of 
transaction by charging more to one side of the market and reducing the price paid by the other 
side”). 
63 See Evans, supra note 60, at 339-40 (elaborating that optimal pricing in a multisided mar-
ket is dependent on the “responsiveness of demand” on each side of the market).  
64 A “relevant market” is the set of products and the geographical area potentially affected by 
a merger or other business conduct. The concept of a relevant market, and what goes into deciding 
what constitutes such a market, are explained in section 4 of the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 
See supra note 21.  
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home addresses.65 This information is certainly valuable, but it misses many 
things a business might like to know. For example, if a business knew what 
products the customer had considered buying but ultimately rejected in 
favor of alternatives (from that particular business as well as from other 
sellers), it would have a better idea of what mix of products to offer and of 
who its competitors are. If a business could know how long the consumer 
had been considering the purchase or how important the purchase was to 
the buyer, it might be able to discern the intensity of a consumer’s desire for 
a particular good. Finally, if a consumer and producer have more interaction 
surrounding a transaction, the producer could learn more about the con-
sumer’s needs, thereby enabling the producer to tailor the process and 
follow-up services to particular buyers.  
Digital platforms can obtain much more of this information than con-
ventional businesses. It is easier for a shopping website to see which prod-
ucts customers have clicked on than it is for a store to follow customers 
around to track their shopping behavior. A conventional business might 
never know whether a shopper turned away from the checkout line to 
replace something on the shelf, whereas an online business will know 
whether a potential buyer left something in his digital shopping cart, and 
will likely send reminders to the buyer about the product left behind or 
offer a better deal.66 The broader the range of products and services a 
platform provides, the richer the picture the platform can paint of its 
customers.  
One way to think of the value of customer data to Internet platforms is 
through three purposes this information serves. First, customer information 
can be an input of production that enables a business to improve its service 
offerings and increase its returns. Second, customer data can be a strategic 
asset that allows a platform to maintain a lead over rivals and to limit entry 
into its market. Third, customer information can be a valuable commodity, 
which the firm could sell to other businesses that cannot collect the data 
themselves. 
 
65 For an example of unusually extensive efforts by a brick-and-mortar business to collect 
more data regarding their customers’ preferences, see Brooks Barnes, The Digital Kingdom, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2013, at B1.  
66 See, e.g., Julie Weed, Simple Tools Help Owners Sift Data for Eager Customers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 13, 2012, at B6 (citing the example of Velvet Palate as a business adeptly narrowing its 
consumer base through the use of such techniques). 
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1. Customer Data as Input of Production 
Customer information is an input of production when platforms use it 
to improve their services and make user interactions more efficient. More 
complete customer information allows a platform to better satisfy customer 
preferences. It allows platforms to serve customers more efficiently by 
targeting products to customers based on their individual profiles. If the 
platform sells advertising, this tailored matching makes advertising on the 
platform more efficient and valuable, in turn allowing the platform to 
charge more for advertising than it could with less effective matching. The 
following description of Facebook explains the payoff derived from such 
information: “[Facebook] is not a conventional business. It has a billion 
users, but its principal stream of revenue comes not from directly selling 
them goods and services, but by offering marketers a chance to target 
tailored advertisements . . . based on what [users] reveal about themselves.”67  
Customized offerings to consumers might, however, also raise the possi-
bility of price discrimination. A platform might use customer data not only 
to discern individual preferences, but also to gauge individual consumers’ 
willingness to pay.68 Therefore, the firm might price discriminate by 
offering products or services at higher prices to those who value the product 
highly and at lower prices to potential buyers on the margin who value the 
product less. Price discrimination harms consumers who value a product 
highly because they will pay more than they would if the seller had to set a 
single market price but benefits consumers whose willingness to pay is 
below that single price but still above the marginal cost of production. The 
net welfare effects of price discrimination for a particular product depend 
on a variety of conditions. While price discrimination is socially beneficial 
to the extent it expands output, it also shifts surplus from consumers to 
producers.69  
2. Information as a Strategic Asset 
Customer information can also be a key strategic asset in a platform’s 
interactions with its competitors. When customer information is a useful 
 
67 Somini Sengupta, Facebook Posts Largest Single Day Gain, N.Y. TIMES BITS (Oct. 24, 2012, 
5:03 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/facebook-posts-largest-single-day-gain-after-
third-quarter-earnings-call. 
68 Editorial, Frequent Fliers, Prepare to Pay More, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2013, at A20 (describing 
price discrimination plans by online travel services). 
69 See R. Preston McAfee, Price Discrimination (discussing the welfare effects of price dis-
crimination), in 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 465, 480-83 (ABA Section of 
Antitrust Law ed., 2008).  
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input for a platform and is not equally available to that platform’s competi-
tors, the informational advantage can help to entrench market power.  
For example, if a given consumer relies primarily on a single platform 
for shopping, social networking, searching the Internet, or any other service, 
then each such platform will probably have more information about that 
consumer than its rivals will have. If a platform is the market leader, it will 
have more users than its rivals will and, accordingly, more overall customer 
information.70 This larger information set might enable the leading firm to 
make information-dependent product improvements that smaller rivals will 
be unable to replicate. A good example of this in practice is FairSeach’s 
complaint against Google. FairSearch (a coalition that includes Microsoft) 
has alleged that Google’s increased volume of search queries creates scale 
advantages in proving and refining search results that a smaller search 
engine cannot match.71 FairSearch argues that Google’s business strategies 
have been designed to horde customer information for itself and stunt 
competition. Whether there is any merit to FairSearch’s allegations is 
beyond the scope of this Article. To date, neither the FTC nor any other 
competition agency has found Google’s conduct in obtaining customer 
information to be anticompetitive. There appears to be little disagreement, 
though, with the general proposition that the more users garnered by an 
Internet platform like a search engine, the better it can optimize its services 
to be more efficient and profitable.72  
Depending on the point at which returns to additional customer infor-
mation begin to diminish, large volumes of such information can give a 
competitive advantage to a leading platform. The more modest the volume 
at which returns from additional information diminish, the more likely it is 
that multiple competing platforms can obtain the customer data they need 
to deliver a competitive product or service. If the benefits of additional 
information begin to decline only at a very high volume of information, and 
if relative differences in access to customer data matter, then control of the 
largest share of customer data could contribute to market dominance. 
Actions surrounding the use and acquisition of customer information can be 
important for understanding competition and thinking about enforcement 
in digital platform markets, as will be further discussed in Part III. 
 
70 See infra Section II.D. 
71 See FairSearch Principles for Evaluating Remedies to Google’s Antitrust Violations, FAIRSEARCH 
(Nov. 19, 2012) http://www.fairsearch.org/uncategorized/fairsearch-principles-for-evaluating-remedies- 
to-googles-antitrust-violations (referring to Google’s “improperly acquired scale advantages”). 
72 Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency in 
Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 147 (2010). 
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3. Customer Data as Commodity 
Finally, the data a digital platform collects may be useful to enterprises 
willing to pay for information about consumers. At this point relatively 
little is known about online data brokerage, at least as compared to the 
analogous business of consumer credit data. It is known, however, that 
online businesses often compile data on their customers and then sell the 
data to brokers who assemble it into consumer profiles.73 Such profiles can 
be of enormous value to prospective employers, insurance companies, and 
businesses looking to identify potential customers or product lines. In short, 
customer data can be a valuable revenue stream for digital businesses quite 
apart from their own use of that data as an input into production processes 
or as a strategic competitive asset.  
D. Entrenchment Through Network Effects 
 and Switching Costs 
Digital platforms may become entrenched because of certain factors on 
the demand side of a given market. For example, some platforms benefit 
from “network effects” that arise because the platform’s value to each 
individual consumer grows with the number of other consumers who use 
the platform.74 Such an effect is most likely to occur in communications or 
social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook, where increasing the 
number of users creates a larger universe of people with whom each user can 
communicate. Each user creates a positive externality for other users by 
enlarging the scope of the service.75 Because the attractiveness of the 
platform grows with the number of users, it is possible for network effects 
to cause a market to “tip” to monopoly.76 Such externalities are less likely to 
occur in other kinds of platforms, such as those for Internet search or on-
line shopping, but these services may nonetheless benefit from less direct 
forms of network effects. A shopping network with a comparatively large 
number of users might be more appealing because of the greater number of 
available product and service reviews. Likewise, a more widely used search 
engine might provide greater confidence to a user because the results she is 
seeing are what many others are seeing and relying upon.  
 
73 Natasha Singer, F.T.C. Plans to Examine Data Broker Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2012, at B1. 
74 See generally Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, System Competition and Network Effects, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93 (discussing the economics of systems that rely on network effects). 
75 See id. at 96 (“In a communications network . . . the demand for a network good is a func-
tion of both its price, and the expected size of the network.”). 
76 Id. at 106 (enumerating “FM vs. AM stereo radio; color vs. black and white television; 
VHS vs. Beta; and typewriter keyboards” as “tipping” examples (internal citations omitted)).  
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In addition, popular platforms might benefit from feedback effects when 
third parties produce an array of complementary products. In turn these 
products attract more users to the platform. This cycle might repeat until no 
other platform can induce much competing complementary innovation.77 
Mobile networking devices like smartphones and tablets (and their underlying 
operating systems) have some utility in themselves, but their utility grows 
as the number of apps with which they are compatible increases. To the 
extent applications developers cannot easily move apps developed for one 
platform to another platform, most will develop apps for the more popular 
platform. This feedback effect could leave the other platform with relatively 
few developers of complementary products, thereby making the competing 
platform less attractive to consumers.78  
Network effects can be reinforced when consumers face costs in switching 
from one product to a substitute.79 At the moment of initial choice, a 
potential customer might weigh all competing products neutrally according 
to price, quality, and other dimensions. For example, suppose that a customer 
considers two products, A and B, that are comparable for the customer’s 
needs; and that the customer chooses product A because its price is $10 
whereas the price of product B is $12. In the absence of switching costs, the 
customer would change to product B for subsequent purchases if the price 
of B fell to $9 and the price of A remained at $10. However, during the time 
the buyer uses product A she might become comfortable with it, might 
invest her time in mastering its use or customizing its features, and might 
make complementary purchases that work better (or exclusively) with A. If 
those things happen, then when the time comes for a new round of purchases, 
the decrease in the price of B might not be enough to attract the customer 
away from A; switching costs have developed and she might be “locked in” 
to product A. To “unlock” the customer, B (or some new market entrant) 
must be priced far enough below A to compensate her for the costs she 
would incur in switching. In other words, the competitor has to price more 
aggressively than it would have to if competing from a fresh start. Switch-
ing costs, therefore, can make market power more durable.  
 
77 But see id. at 94-95 (“Although it seems plausible that the inertia associated with network 
effects has somehow deprived us of valuable new technologies, it is abundantly clear that many 
new, incompatible technologies are in fact successfully introduced.”).  
78 See, e.g., David Goldman, BlackBerry’s Biggest Problem: The App Gap, CNNMONEY (Aug. 5, 
2010), http://money.cnn.com/2010/08/05/technology/killer_apps/index.htm. 
79 See generally Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-in: Competition with 
Switching Costs and Network Effects (discussing “switching costs” and their effects on competition), in 
3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1967, 1977–2007 (Mark Armstrong & Robert H. 
Porter eds., 2007).  
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The presence of network, feedback, or lock-in effects does not necessarily 
lead to increased market power. Network effects can be shared among rivals 
if those rivals interconnect with each other or in some other way share the 
source of the positive network externality; feedback effects can exist for 
multiple platforms simultaneously, as application development for both 
Apple and Android devices show; and technology and pricing can help to 
overcome switching costs. Each of these effects, however, can contribute to a 
platform’s market dominance and, under the right conditions—where there 
is no interconnectivity between platforms or one platform has an early and 
large lead in complementary products—can contribute to the development 
and durability of platform monopolies.  
E. Innovation 
If there is any single force that best characterizes digital platform mar-
kets, it is probably the intensive and continuous investment in research and 
development to improve existing products and develop new platforms and 
applications. It is easy to find examples of companies quickly rising and 
falling on the Internet: AOL was once dominant in instant messaging and a 
major platform for content and applications, but it is now a much less 
significant enterprise;80 MySpace entered to acclaim but was leapfrogged by 
Facebook;81 Altavista, Lycos, and Yahoo! led the market for online search 
engines in the mid-1990s before Google supplanted those incumbents.82 In 
2006, Symbian was the dominant mobile operating system, and RIM had 
the largest share of smartphone device sales. Since Apple started selling the 
iPhone in 2007, it has captured roughly one-third of the smartphone 
market.83 Google’s Android operating system launched commercially in 
2007 and now powers just over half of all smartphones.84 Devices like tablets 
and smartphones have become important platforms for nonmobile access, 
disrupting the dominance of conventional computers. These devices have 
 
80 See, e.g., Jesse Singal, Saying Goodbye to AOL Instant Messenger, THE DAILY BEAST (Mar. 17, 
2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/03/17/saying-goodbye-to-aol-instant-messenger.html. 
81 See, e.g., Felix Gillette, The Rise and Inglorious Fall of Myspace, BUSINESSWEEK.COM ( June 
22, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_27/b4235053917570.htm. 
82 See, e.g., Dominic Rushe, Yahoo: The Rise and Fall of an Internet Pioneer, GUARDIAN ( Jan. 
20, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jan/20/yahoo-rise-fall-internet-pioneer. 
83
 Press Release, ComScore, ComScore Reports October 2012 U.S. Mobile Subscriber Market 
Share (Nov. 30, 2012), available at http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press_Releases/2012/11/ 
comScore_Reports_October_2012_U.S._Mobile_Subscriber_Market_Share (reporting the market 
shares for the top smartphone operating systems). 
84 Id. 
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also reduced the need for intermediary platforms, like search engines and 
shopping portals, by providing a direct gateway to applications. 
Innovation is to some degree a component of any industry. The differ-
ence with digital platforms is that R&D is the central input of production, 
not merely an episodic activity that affects the production process. Put 
differently, the R&D process and the production process are essentially the 
same thing for many products and services related to the Internet and 
digital platforms. For example, search engines constantly revise and refine 
the algorithms that match consumers’ queries to search results.85 Social 
media platforms continually add features and make changes to optimize 
performance.86 Shopping platforms regularly introduce new interactive 
features using the information customers provide through such interac-
tions.87 Even devices like smartphones and tablets regularly update them-
selves to improve performance and add capabilities before manufacturers 
introduce new models.88 Such innovation in digital markets is sometimes 
incremental and sometimes a more fundamental break with anything that 
has come before. The key point is that it is rare to find a significant digital 
product or service that stays the same from day to day. Firms attract and 
retain consumers more by changing the features and functionality than by 
changing the price terms. Importantly, innovation also comes from the 
customer side, with consumers developing new ways to use digital platforms 
and applications to their own advantage. Innovation and R&D are therefore 
relevant not just to the next model or version of something a customer 
might buy, but also to the next use the customer might make of a given 
product or service. 
F. Implications for Antitrust Enforcement 
The characteristics of digital platforms make competition enforcement 
more challenging than usual. While often efficient, the aggregation of 
content and services to which a platform provides access can amplify its 
 
85 See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, Google Changes Search Algorithm, Trying to Make Results More 
Timely, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Nov. 3, 2011, 1:23 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/ 
google-changes-search-algorithm-trying-to-make-results-more-timely.  
86 See, e.g., Bianca Bosker, With New News Feed, Facebook Tries to Become What It Once Was: A 
Social Network, HUFF POST TECH (Mar. 7, 2013, 5:34 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
bianca-bosker/facebook-new-news-feed_b_2832218.html.  
87 See, e.g., Rebecca Greenfield, Amazon Is Changing the Future of Online Shopping, ATLANTIC 
WIRE (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2011/09/amazon-changing-future-
online-shopping/42107.  
88 See, e.g., Android Version History, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_version_ 
history (last updated Mar. 31, 2013).  
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market power. The multisided nature of platform goods makes it harder to 
gauge a digital platform’s incentives and abilities to engage in exclusionary 
conduct or exercise market power. The network, feedback, and lock-in 
effects that can arise in platform markets might provide real benefits to 
consumers but also entrench market power in a platform that gains the lead 
in its relevant markets. Finally, innovation is itself the production process 
for many digital goods and services and is thus a particularly continuous and 
integral aspect of platform competition. Taken together, these factors make 
it more difficult than in conventional product markets for competition 
agencies and courts to make judgments about how digital platforms’ conduct 
and transactions affect consumers and markets. The next Part will explain 
why those characteristics do not, however, weigh entirely against antitrust 
enforcement, and will discuss two ways in which antitrust enforcement 
might better account for the effects of digital platforms’ conduct and 
transactions. 
III. REFOCUSING ANTITRUST ON INFORMATION  
AND INNOVATION EFFECTS 
Two relatively recent trends in antitrust policy help to address some of 
the error-cost arguments against competition enforcement in dynamic 
markets: (1) the declining emphasis on market definition and structural 
presumptions,89 and (2) the increasing incorporation of innovation effects 
and incentives in antitrust analysis.90 While these general trends are helpful, 
there are two other ways by which antitrust analysis can further adapt to the 
particular characteristics and competitive implications of digital platforms. 
First, competitive analysis should focus on the roles of customer data in 
firm conduct; and second, it should examine how conduct and transactions 
might block the very innovation that antitrust critics invoke to argue against 
competition enforcement. 
A. Customer Information and Competitive Effects 
Information is a critical input into the production of digital platforms’ 
products and services. Information, however, should also factor into the 
analysis of competitive effects for two reasons. First, information is a key 
input of production and a strategic competitive asset. Thus, significant 
effects of conduct or transactions may occur in the market for data rather 
 
89 See supra subsection I.B.1.  
90 See infra Section III.B.  
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than in the market for final goods and services. A focus on customer data, 
therefore, can reveal competitive effects that a focus on prices and outputs 
might miss. 
Second, data may be a key commodity exchanged between platforms and 
end users. Customers reveal information to platforms in exchange for 
services.91 In return, platforms use that information for better or for worse 
from the standpoint of consumer welfare. Even in the absence of any 
conventional price or output effects, anticompetitive conduct or transactions 
could enable platforms to exercise market power to give customers less of 
the good things—improved service, innovative products, and good privacy 
and data security policies—for which consumers might implicitly barter 
their information. While increased competition, at least on its own, will not 
always cause firms to better use or protect customer information, any 
competitive effects analysis that misses these two nonprice dimensions of 
platform market performance will be incomplete and could be biased toward 
underenforcement. 
1. Information and Exclusion 
If customer information is both a necessary input of production and a 
“rivalrous” good—meaning that one user of information can exclude 
another—a platform’s acquisition of customer information may have an 
exclusionary effect on competition. A shopping portal that has a large share 
of online consumer purchasers could thereby acquire a larger base of customer 
data, giving it advantages over its rivals in marketing goods and selling 
advertising. If network effects, switching costs, or simple habits cause 
customers to adhere to the leading e-commerce site, then that site’s exclu-
sive access to its large share of customer information could help maintain its 
market position.  
A platform such as a shopping portal could further increase its access to 
customer data through mergers with other firms that also receive significant 
customer traffic. But such deals can create complexity, and perhaps confu-
sion, about the markets relevant for analyzing the competitive effects of the 
transactions. For example, a social networking platform might acquire a 
photo-sharing business to integrate into its existing services. At first glance, 
the transaction is a vertical one, with an obvious horizontal element if the 
 
91 See Natasha Singer, Do Not Track? Advertisers Say ‘Don’t Tread on Us,’ N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 
2012, at BU 3 (describing “the barter system wherein consumers allow sites and third-party ad 
networks to collect information about their online activities in exchange for open access to maps, 
email, games, music, social networks and whatnot”). 
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acquiring platform already has a share of the photo-sharing market. The 
transaction might also, however, concentrate databases of valuable customer 
information and, through this combination, take on a horizontal dimension 
that could affect competition among platforms.  
Similarly, a supply agreement through which a search engine provides a 
vertical website’s internal search services would clearly implicate the market 
for custom search services, especially if the deal were an exclusive one. But, 
this arrangement might also possess horizontal elements, related to the 
customer data the search provider would gain from traffic on the vertical 
site. If the relevant foreclosure analysis focuses on the market for search 
syndication and ignores the market for customer information, it could miss 
important effects, which might in turn give rise to even more pronounced 
foreclosure effects. 
These two examples suggest how, in digital industries, particularly those 
tied to e-commerce, advertising, and various end-user applications, a focus 
on customer information can reveal horizontal dimensions of facially 
vertical conduct and transactions. Recognition of the role of consumer data 
as an input in digital platform products could therefore show competitive 
effects that are unrelated to prices or other terms on which the platform 
provides services.  
2. Customer Information and Market Power  
over End Users 
When consumers do business with a digital platform, they inevitably 
disclose some personal information. This information may range from the 
relatively innocuous—for example, the state one lives in—to the intensely 
personal—such as medical history or sexual orientation. While people’s 
preferences and practices for disclosing personal information vary,92 it 
seems reasonable to assume—all else being equal—that when faced with a 
choice about whether to disclose or withhold information, most consumers 
would prefer to withhold it absent some benefit in return. The benefits 
from sharing can be objective and tangible or subjective and intangible; but 
after a point, people will want a reason—or something in return—to reveal 
data about themselves.93 In other words, holding price, service quality, and 
everything else constant, digital platform customers would rather reveal less 
 
92 See generally Kay Connelly et al., Do I Do What I Say?: Observed Versus Stated Privacy Prefer-
ences (Ind. Univ., Unnumbered Working Paper, 2007), available at http://www.cs.indiana.edu/ 
~connelly/Papers/C17_Interact-07.pdf (measuring individuals’ varying privacy concerns in 
ubiquitous computing environments). 
93 See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 68. 
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information about themselves, and would prefer that those platforms 
maintain strong, rather than weak, privacy policies regarding the data that 
customers do disclose.  
Firms, too, might differ in their preferences with regard to consumer 
data. If customer information is valuable to a platform’s production process—
for instance, if it is an input into the ongoing innovation and improvement 
of the platform’s products—the platform would prefer to have more of it 
rather than less. And if relative volumes of consumer data affect competi-
tion among platforms, especially if consumers use only a limited number of 
platforms such that the quest for data is to some degree a zero-sum game, a 
platform might seek to obtain more data if for no other reason than to 
prevent its rivals from doing so. Similarly, if the platform has alternative 
ways in which to use the data it obtains from customers, it may want to 
adopt privacy policies that preserve the firm’s flexibility to “repurpose” 
customer information.94  
Digital platforms may utilize customer information in ways that are 
more or less beneficial to consumers. They might use the information to 
improve offerings and make service faster and more individualized, or they 
might simply collect the data and hoard it for its option value or competi-
tive advantage. Platforms might protect customer data through strong 
security measures and privacy policies, or they might invest little in data 
protection and instead use the information in ways that benefit the firm but 
that consumers do not like.95 One measure of a platform’s market power is 
the extent to which it can engage in the latter behavior without some benefit 
to consumers that offsets their reduced privacy and still retain users. 
In theory, reductions in beneficial uses of consumer information and in 
the strength of privacy and security policies could correspondingly reduce 
the marginal cost of producing a platform’s good or service. Suppose that in 
each transaction, a firm could analyze its existing database in order to 
customize the transaction to the consumer’s benefit. If that data processing 
entails a cost, the firm’s decision not to undertake the beneficial processing 
also reduces marginal costs, thereby expanding output. In theory, the 
 
94 See generally Joseph Farrell, Can Privacy Be Just Another Good?, 10 J.  ON TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 251, 254 (2012). 
95 See, e.g., Fred Stutzman, Ralph Gross & Alessandro Acquisti, Silent Listeners: The Evolution 
of Privacy and Disclosure on Facebook, 4 J. PRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALITY, no. 2, 2012, at 7, 8-9, 
available at http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1098&context=jpc (finding that 
Facebook users continue to share more personal information on the social website, despite their 
increasing privacy concerns). 
  
1690 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 1663 
 
consumer should be compensated for the reduced benefit through a lower-
priced service.  
Similarly, as Joseph Farrell has demonstrated, a firm that chooses a 
weaker privacy policy may earn revenue through subsequent use of customer 
data that is analytically equivalent to a reduction in the marginal cost of the 
services the firm provides to consumers.96 If, in providing its services to 
consumers, a firm incurs a marginal cost of X, but can then turn around and 
sell the data it gathers from each transaction for a profit of Y, the marginal 
cost per transaction with the original consumer is X – Y.97 Marginal cost is 
therefore lower for a firm that has a weak privacy policy and resells consumer 
data than for a firm that has a strong privacy policy and refrains from 
repurposing that data. Consumers, or at least many of them, might not like 
the fact that the firm has weak privacy protections, but they are at least 
compensated by the higher output and lower prices that result from the 
weaker policy.98  
In each of the above cases, consumers benefit from lower prices if the 
platform neither uses customer information to improve service nor adopts 
stronger privacy policies. In theory, then, consumers might not be harmed 
by reduced processing or protection of the data they disclose to platforms. 
In practice, however, there may be two challenges in achieving this equilib-
rium. First, for some important platform services, there are no prices and 
thus no simple mechanism by which consumers can compensate the plat-
form. Second, a platform’s use and protection of customer data is often 
difficult for consumers to observe or understand. The consequence of free 
services is that there must either be some nonprice means by which con-
sumers compensate platforms for incurring the higher marginal costs of 
beneficial data analysis and stronger data protection, or some manner by 
which the platform is able to recover the higher marginal costs on a different 
side of the market—for example, from advertisers. The second problem—
observability—leads to potentially even more severe consequences. If 
consumers cannot tell whether a firm uses and protects data well or poorly, 
platforms will lack incentive to choose comparatively pro-consumer policies. 
A firm could disclose its policies to consumers, although there is substantial 
evidence supporting the contention that consumers rarely read or understand 
 
96 Id. at 254-55 (setting up an equation reflecting how privacy practices can affect consumers’ 
willingness to pay).  
97 This is a simplification of Farrell’s model. See id. (presenting a hypothetical case calculating 
demand for a book under two distinct privacy scenarios).  
98 See id. at 255 (explaining how customers can benefit from either stronger or weaker privacy 
protections). 
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such disclosures.99 A platform could advertise its pro-consumer data protec-
tion policies, but such advertising would add greater incremental costs to 
the amount already spent on beneficial data analysis and strong privacy 
protections. 
Competition can help solve these problems, even if it cannot solve them 
completely. Digital platform services are largely “experience” goods, the 
qualities and characteristics of which are difficult to assess in advance but 
relatively easy to judge upon actual use.100 If consumers can experience 
competing platforms, they will be able to draw conclusions about which 
platform provides the better service and which makes better use of their 
data. Such comparative experiences can act as substitutes for quantitative 
data, but require some level of competition in the relevant platform market. 
Privacy and data security policies may be harder for consumers to judge 
by experience unless the policies are so weak that the consumer becomes the 
victim of a security breach or obvious abuse by the platform. Competition, 
however, may drive platforms to adopt and adhere to stronger privacy 
policies, making it worthwhile for a platform to advertise such policies to 
consumers in order to differentiate itself from its competitors. And because 
compliance with such announced policies has proven to be an issue,101 
consumer protection regulation may be necessary even in a competitive 
platform market. Although the problem of consumers’ failure to read or 
understand privacy policies remains a possible source of market failure, 
competition can at least help introduce better privacy and data security 
practices into the marketplace. 
To the extent that competition promotes improved services and privacy 
policies, anticompetitive conduct diminishes both of these consumer 
benefits. In conventional antitrust terms, anticompetitive conduct can 
enable a platform to extract more information from customers without 
offering the level of quality a consumer could barter for in a more competi-
tive market. While this information-related harm need not relate to price, it 
could nonetheless have a competitive effect in digital platform markets. An 
error-cost analysis of antitrust enforcement that does not take account of 
 
99 See FTC, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA 
OF RAPID CHANGE 26-27 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf 
(explaining that privacy policies have become so long and incomprehensible to consumers that it is 
not possible to make meaningful decisions based on them). 
100 See Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311, 313-14 (1970) 
(explaining that consumers collect information—beyond readily available price data—from 
experience). 
101 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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information effects would overlook this important form of consumer harm 
and therefore be incomplete. 
B. Innovation Effects 
Innovation is a critical dimension of competition and one that antitrust 
law strongly protects. In the landmark case Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., the Second Circuit established that firms may, without notice to 
competitors, introduce new products in a manner that gives them advantages 
over rivals.102 The court moreover declined to inquire into the quality of the 
innovation or its benefits to consumers.103 In Microsoft II, the D.C. Circuit 
endorsed and expanded upon these principles.104 Innovation inevitably 
leaves some firms behind and may confer market power on the innovating 
firm. Yet, under these courts’ logic, innovation greatly benefits consumers 
and should not be viewed as any more harmful to competition than when a 
firm cuts price and thereby leaves its rivals without customers. There is thus 
nothing double-edged about innovation: it is not harm to competition, but 
rather competition itself. The only parties who might be “harmed” are those 
competitors that cannot keep up.  
In addition to changing the analytic framework for enforcement from 
one that begins with market definition to one that begins with competitive 
effects, competition policy for digital platforms would benefit from further 
shifting its focus from conventional price and output effects to innovation 
effects. There are several reasons why this shift might improve the long-
term performance of platform markets while reducing the overenforcement 
errors that some commentators have identified.  
First, innovation is the main reason it is so hard to draw competitive 
inferences from current market structures in digital industries.105 Thus, 
focusing on innovation can help competition authorities understand when 
they are dealing with a market in which it will be harder to pursue conven-
tional antitrust concerns about price and output and in which caution in 
pursuing those conventional concerns is warranted. 
Second, and more importantly, a focus on how conduct affects innova-
tion fits logically with the principal objection lodged against competition 
enforcement in technologically dynamic markets: Competition in such 
 
102 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 1979). 
103 See id. at 286-87 (arguing that evaluations of product quality have little meaning because 
customers have idiosyncratic preferences). 
104 See 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that mere harm to one or more competitors is 
insufficient to find a monopoly).  
105 See supra Section II.E.  
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markets may take the form of racing to introduce new or improved products 
rather than cutting prices on existing products. Such markets may therefore 
involve sequential monopolies that leapfrog each other, rather than simul-
taneous competitors that vie for market share.106 If this “Schumpeterian” 
story is correct, then a focus on short-term price and output levels will miss 
the competition taking place through innovation. Such a mistake could be 
particularly costly to society because the welfare gains of long-run tech-
nological innovation can swamp the welfare losses from shorter-term price 
increases and output reductions.  
If the Schumpeterian story is correct, however, then it is also true that 
any impediment to innovation will have social costs—whether it comes from 
government enforcement or from the conduct of incumbent firms. A natural 
implication of the Schumpeterian argument is that a firm with market 
power would, if acting in its own economic interests, have an incentive to 
interfere with the cycle of “creative destruction” by impeding rivals’ ability 
to develop new products or services that threaten its dominance. Sun 
Microsystems made such a claim against Microsoft’s efforts to impede Java’s 
cross-platform interface;107 Microsoft leveled a similar accusation against 
Google for allegedly blocking search and indexing functions of rival search 
engines and mobile devices.108  
Enforcement that focuses on how a dominant firm’s conduct might ex-
clude or deter innovation is, therefore, consistent with a Schumpeterian 
view of competition. It is less likely to make the error of prioritizing short-
run prices over the greater benefits of innovation. The critical challenge is, 
as always, to identify conduct that has such harmful effects. The following 
sections discuss some ideas for recognizing monopoly conduct that harms 
innovation and for identifying mergers that will likely diminish innovation. 
1. Innovation-Excluding Conduct 
Any conduct that excludes rivals from the marketplace might harm inno-
vation by eliminating potential sources of new products and technology. Not 
 
106 See Katz & Shelanski, supra note 25, at 4-5 (introducing the “Schumpeterian competition” 
argument). 
107 See Microsoft II, 253 F.3d at 74 (discussing actions Microsoft took after signing a Java dis-
tribution agreement that led a district court to find that Microsoft acted in an anticompetitive 
manner toward Sun Microsystems). 
108 Tiffany Kaiser, Microsoft Shouts Antitrust over YouTube Snub, DAILY TECH ( Jan. 3, 2013, 
10:11 AM), http://www.dailytech.com/Microsoft+Shouts+Antitrust+Over+YouTube+Snub/article 
29542.htm (reporting a Microsoft executive’s complaint about FTC inaction regarding Google’s 
anticompetitive conduct). 
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all such conduct is anticompetitive, however. As discussed in Part I, innova-
tion itself excludes rivals by leaving them behind or by shutting them out of 
complementary product relationships, yet that innovation can still improve 
social welfare. United States law, as well as a body of economic thinking, 
strongly presumes that such innovation will be beneficial and should not be 
grounds for antitrust enforcement.109 In theory, one can imagine a spectrum 
running from conduct that is purely exclusionary to conduct that is purely 
inventive. One might argue for introducing competition enforcement at the 
point in the spectrum where the costs of exclusion begin to outweigh the 
benefits of invention.  
In practice, however, judging where that transition occurs is very diffi-
cult and is likely to lead to risky inquiries into either the value of an innova-
tive effort or the motives for which it was undertaken. An example of such 
line-drawing problems involves Google’s implementation of allegedly 
discriminatory search algorithms, which rank websites returned according to 
a proprietary formula that changes regularly. Google argues that its algo-
rithm changes improve search results for consumers and weed out websites 
that game the ranking system to obtain artificially high placement in search 
results.110 But commentators and litigants have claimed that, regardless of 
the benefits that flow from some of Google’s algorithm changes, other 
changes disable competitors regardless of the quality of those competitors’ 
sites.111  
Assuming for the sake of argument that both claims are true—that algo-
rithm changes improve matching of results but also harm some legitimate 
applications providers—there are several possible explanations for this 
mixed result. One explanation might be that algorithms are a constant work 
in progress and that some exclusion inevitably occurs when the algorithm, 
in its quest better to match answers to queries, reorders the ranking of 
search results. Another possible explanation is that algorithm changes 
 
109 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft I), 147 F.3d 935, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(“Antitrust scholars have long recognized the undesirability of having courts oversee product 
design, and any dampening of technological innovation would be at cross purposes with antitrust 
law.”); Berkey Photo, Inc., v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 1979) (observing that 
the law encourages firms to compete aggressively); Richard Gilbert, Holding Innovation to an 
Antitrust Standard, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Spring 2007, at 47, 60-61, 66 (describing the “no 
economic sense” test and noting that most courts that have dealt with cases alleging anticompeti-
tive innovation have applied a standard that more closely agrees with such a test). 
110 See Steve Lohr & Claire Cain Miller, Living, and Dying, in Google’s World, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 2012, at B1.  
111 See Pasquale, supra note 72, at 157-58 (recounting an incident when Google changed its 
algorithm to prevent manipulation).  
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reflect a mix of corporate motives: to improve matching, but also to dis-
criminate against particular rivals.  
Competition enforcers could adopt a number of approaches to these 
mixed results depending on whether the changes are on balance more 
beneficial than harmful, or depending on whether the harms are intentional 
or not. Both inquiries, however, run the risk of calling into question a 
company’s best judgment about how to engineer its own products. Finding 
that an innovation—say a new proprietary interface or product integration—
is anticompetitive because the value of the innovation to consumers is 
deemed ex post to be outweighed by the costs of competitive exclusion will 
cause firms to hesitate to make beneficial product changes. Knowing that 
the firm could be punished for the effects the innovation has on rivals if the 
innovation does not turn out well (or perhaps turns out too well for compet-
itors’ tastes), the firm will raise the required ex ante probability of success 
and undertake fewer R&D efforts. Similarly, punishing a firm that has bad 
or mixed motives for undertaking innovation might harm consumers by 
deterring product changes that benefit consumers despite the firm’s partly 
anticompetitive motives.  
Absent compelling evidence, then, caution and modesty in enforcement 
are warranted in this area. This prescription comes not from a glib hope that 
competition or innovation will somehow eradicate any harm, but from the 
risk that intervention is as likely to make things worse as to make things 
better. Some have advocated for a government regulatory body to evaluate 
search algorithms and other intermediary behavior on the Internet.112 There 
are compelling reasons to be very skeptical of interposing such a govern-
ment review process into the ongoing and demanding process of private 
innovation. Algorithms change quickly and must adapt to gaming and 
manipulation by those seeking to profit from online search.113 Regulators are 
certain to know less about a new technology than those who invent and 
work with it daily. Moreover, regulatory processes and related litigation will 
inevitably become part of rivals’ competitive strategy, distracting resources 
from competition and innovation in the marketplace. A much better course 
is for government to give a wide berth to innovation, even where the firm’s 
intentions may not seem benevolent and where the conduct may appear to 
 
112 See, e.g., Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and 
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1167 (2008) (“[P]olicymakers should 
at least consider restrictions on the ability of search engines to manipulate their results.”); 
Pasquale, supra note 72, at 160 (describing the characteristics of search engines and carriers that 
“strongly militate” in favor of regulatory intervention).  
113 David Segal, The Dirty Little Secrets of Search, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2011, at B1. 
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harm competition at the same time that it benefits consumers. And where 
there is a compelling case for harm, ex post intervention on a case-by-case 
basis through antitrust law is preferable to general regulation in this context. 
This wide berth does not, however, mean we should abandon enforce-
ment or place all purportedly innovative conduct beyond the reach of 
antitrust law. Microsoft II114 gave significant deference to product innovation 
and integration, but clearly left open the door to a finding that such activity 
was a ruse or pretext for anticompetitive exclusion. It allowed for antitrust 
liability where a product innovation was not in some way different and 
better than what a consumer could do for himself, thereby preserving 
anticompetitive tying as a possible claim against a software platform.115  
Generalizing from the Microsoft II decision, where innovation was clearly a 
pretext for harming rivals or for deterring rival innovation, competition en-
forcement should be available. Two kinds of conduct which digital platforms 
have been accused of undertaking would appear to harm innovation without 
constituting legitimate innovation: raising rivals’ costs and forced free riding.  
a. Raising Rivals’ Costs 
This first category of conduct comprises activities that impede rivals 
without benefitting consumers.116 It requires distinguishing innovation from 
activities undertaken to interfere with a competitor’s product or service. In 
some contexts, this conduct may be justifiable. A producer whose product is 
reverse engineered might redesign the product to prevent rivals from free 
riding on the firm’s technology. In other contexts, however, the free-riding 
defense does not apply. In Microsoft II, the court found that the defendant’s 
commingling of Internet Explorer code with Windows code served no 
purpose other than to make it more difficult for consumers to use browsers 
other than Explorer.117 Such conduct had the effect of deterring competing 
browser innovation and of blocking new browser platforms that themselves 
could have supported complementary product development and threatened 
Microsoft’s operating system monopoly. It created a barrier to competitors’ 
efforts to innovate.  
More recently, Microsoft accused Google of similar conduct: preventing 
rival search engines from fully searching and indexing YouTube, allegedly 
 
114 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
115 See id. at 65-66.  
116 See generally Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. 
REV. 267, 267-69 (1983) (providing a general discussion of anticompetitive business practices that 
raise costs for consumers).  
117 Microsoft II, 253 F.3d at 66-67. 
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constraining search rivals to video search results that were inferior to 
Google’s. Similarly, the FTC investigated allegations that Google used 
proprietary interfaces (APIs) to make it harder for advertisers on Google’s 
platform to move their ad campaigns to competing platforms. In the face of 
the FTC’s investigation of such complaints, Google reversed its API policy. 
To the extent that a digital platform alters a product specifically to interfere 
with the competitiveness of rival platforms, it interferes with the growth of 
rivals and with the Schumpeterian cycle through which the currently 
dominant firm must innovate or be creatively destroyed.  
The FTC’s 2009 complaint against Intel focused on a different strategy 
for raising rivals’ costs.118 In that case, the FTC charged, among other 
things, that Intel had engaged in a form of price discounting that effectively 
imposed a large tax on any computer maker that reduced its purchases from 
Intel and instead bought chips from Intel’s competitor AMD.119 Customers 
received increasingly greater discounts as they bought larger shares of their 
chip needs from Intel.120 From this, AMD experienced tremendous difficulty 
introducing advanced chips into the marketplace, allegedly allowing Intel to 
obstruct the growth of innovation-based competition in the microprocessor 
market.121 Intel settled the case with the FTC by entering into a consent 
decree prohibiting such market-share based discounting.122  
In the same investigation, the FTC examined complaints that Intel was 
designing certain of its chips deliberately to disable consumers from using 
rival Nvidia’s leading graphical processors in tandem with Intel chips,123 
thereby blocking competing innovation in graphics technology.124 As part of 
its consent order from the FTC, and without admitting liability, Intel 
agreed not to implement the disabling design change in the relevant class of 
microprocessors.125 Neither aspect of the settlement was aimed at limiting 
Intel’s competitive gains from innovation. Rather, the settlement focused on 
remedying Intel’s alleged attempts to block disruptive innovation by 
competitors. 
Enforcement actions taken against business conduct that raises rivals’ 
costs face a number of objections. One possible objection is that design 
 
118 Complaint at 8, In re Intel Corp., No. 9341 (F.T.C. Dec. 16, 2009), available at http:// 
www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelcmpt.pdf.  
119 Id. at 2. 
120 Id. at 3. 
121 Id. at 5. 
122 See FTC, supra note 52. 
123 See Complaint, supra note 118, at 4. 
124 Id. 
125 See FTC, supra note 52. 
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changes that appear to have the purpose of harming rivals could actually be 
genuine innovation efforts or procompetitive attempts to protect the firm’s 
initial R&D investment. As such, some commentators have argued that 
antitrust law should not recognize predatory innovation or design change 
claims.126 To require firms to interconnect their products or systems with 
rivals is a form of compulsory dealing that is disfavored in American 
antitrust law.127 In this view, requiring Microsoft to write its operating 
system code in a way that makes it easier for Explorer’s rivals to inter-
operate with Windows amounts to requiring Microsoft to deal with those 
rivals. Requiring a dominant search engine to allow rival search engines to 
return full results to their users from vertical applications owned by the 
dominant search engine is a similar example of compulsory dealing.  
A pragmatic response to these objections is that the Microsoft II court 
found it possible to distinguish, for example, between Microsoft’s commin-
gling of browser and operating system code (anticompetitive) and Microsoft’s 
embedding of a feature in Windows that sometimes overrode a user’s choice 
of browser other than Internet Explorer ( justifiable product design). 
Similarly, the court of appeals in Microsoft I was able to articulate and apply 
a distinction between technological integration that represents genuine 
innovation and product integration designed for anticompetitive foreclo-
sure.128 The court in Microsoft II stated that “[a]s a general rule, courts are 
properly very skeptical about claims that competition has been harmed by a 
dominant firm’s product design changes,” but nonetheless admonished that 
“[ j]udicial deference to product innovation . . . does not mean that a 
monopolist’s product design decisions are per se lawful.”129 Scholars have 
built upon Microsoft II to propose a variety of approaches to distinguishing 
innovation from exclusionary conduct.130 A doctrinal response to these 
objections is that even U.S. law, which strictly limits refusal-to-deal or 
predatory innovation claims, does not entirely foreclose theories of harm 
based on exclusion of rivals from access to resources they need to com-
pete.131 The Microsoft II court did not see the claims before it as pleas for 
mandatory dealing that would be barred by applicable refusal-to-deal cases. 
U.S. antitrust law recognizes claims where there is no business justification 
 
126 See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 109, at 76. 
127 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004). 
128 Microsoft I, 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
129  Microsoft II, 253 F.3d 34, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
130 E.g., Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal 
Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617 (1999). 
131 See, e.g., Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408 (“Under certain circumstances, a refusal to cooperate with 
rivals can constitute anticompetitive conduct and violate § 2.”). 
  
2013] Competition Policy for the Internet  1699 
 
for a change in an ongoing course of dealing, even when the claim demands 
that the dominant firm deal with its rival.132 Other jurisdictions, like the 
European Union, are more lenient and appear to recognize a somewhat 
broader duty to deal under an essential-facilities theory.133  
b. Forced Free Riding 
Forced free riding occurs when a platform appropriates innovation by 
other firms that depend on the platform for access to consumers. For 
example, some online businesses have accused Google of “scraping” content 
from competitors—or potential competitors—in lines of business vertically 
related to Google’s search platform and using that content on its proprietary 
websites. Jeremy Stoppelman, the CEO of the review website Yelp, testified 
in a U.S. Senate hearing: 
Websites typically allow search engines like Google to crawl and index their 
sites so that links to their sites can appear in response to relevant search 
engine queries. . . .  
In 2010, Google began incorporating the content that it indexed from its 
competitors into Google Local without permission. Although Google had 
previously acknowledged that it needed a license to use Yelp’s content, it 
was now using it without permission to prop up its own, less effective prod-
uct. In some instances, Google even presented this content to its users as if 
it were its own. . . .  
In response to our objections, Google informed us that it would cease the 
practice only if we agreed to be removed from Google’s web search index, 
thereby preventing Yelp from appearing anywhere in Google web search 
results. This, of course, was a false choice. . . . [I]t is a choice between allow-
ing Google to co-opt one’s content and not competing at all.134  
 
132 See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 604 (1985) 
(acknowledging that while a business has no duty to deal with its rival, attempting to exclude 
rivals on some basis other than efficiency is predatory anticompetitive conduct).  
133 See, e.g., James Turney, Defining the Limits of the EU Essential Facilities Doctrine on Intellectual 
Property Rights: The Primacy of Securing Optimal Innovation, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 179, 
179 (2005) (“For over fifteen years, the European Court of Justice . . . has accepted that in certain 
exceptional circumstances, a refusal to supply a potential competitor with an essential facility can 
amount to a [monopolistic act].”). 
134 The Power of Google: Serving Consumers or Threatening Competition?: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. 247 (2011) (submission of Jeremy Stoppelman, Cofounder and CEO, Yelp! Inc.). 
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Mr. Stoppelman testified that Google was using Yelp’s more developed 
service to fill Google Local’s “relatively threadbare” site with content and 
reviews.135 A similar complaint led to an episode in which Google acknowl-
edged scraping the content of a website called Mocality, by both replicating 
its content and soliciting its customers.136  
Viewed through a conventional antitrust lens, the practice of content 
scraping appears to present more of an intellectual property issue than a 
competitive concern. But when viewed from the perspective of innovation, 
such conduct is damaging, even absent any intellectual property violation. 
This is because the process of appropriating the developments of down-
stream rivals disincentivizes future downstream innovation. Specifically, 
scraping sends the message that as soon as a firm develops a complementary 
product that is superior to the platform’s proprietary complement, the 
platform will snatch the improvements for itself. This conduct also removes 
the platform’s incentive to continue developing its own product, thus 
further magnifying the harm to competition. 
The calculation for whether such forced free riding makes long-run eco-
nomic sense for the platform remains complex. But there is reason to think 
that such “vertical arithmetic” is more favorable for scraping than for simple 
foreclosure of the downstream rival’s access to the platform. A foreclosed 
vertical application is a potential loss for the platform in two ways: the 
absence of the application might make the platform less attractive to end 
users, and the application would be lost as a customer for advertising or 
other services the platform sells to complement providers. Therefore, while 
the platform might take some of the customers of the foreclosed application 
for itself, that gain might be offset by other losses. In contrast, with scrap-
ing, the platform might be able to drive some of the downstream rival’s 
customers to itself without incurring the R&D costs it would otherwise take 
to gain those customers, all while keeping the rival as an attraction for end 
users and as a potential advertiser on the platform.  
Raising rivals’ costs and free riding are not “innovation,” in that those 
activities do not contribute to the development and deployment of new or 
improved products. The raising-rivals-costs strategy is a product change, 
but one designed to harm competitors rather than to benefit consumers. 
Scraping and free riding involve the appropriation of others’ investment in 
product development. Much conduct will not be easily classified as belonging 
 
135 Id. 
136 Jay Yarow, Google Admits It Scraped the Database of a Kenyan Startup, Says It Was a Huge 
Mistake, BUSINESS INSIDER ( Jan. 14, 2012), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2012-01-14/tech/ 
30626733_1_google-project-google-declines-business.  
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in one of those categories, or might appear to be simultaneously exclusionary 
and innovative. Antitrust agencies in those cases should tread lightly. But, 
as shown above, some “innovative” conduct is significantly more likely to 
harm competition. Antitrust enforcement should not shy away from ad-
dressing such conduct. Indeed, competition policy should take underen-
forcement errors as seriously as overenforcement errors. The goal here has 
been to identify conduct where reticent enforcement is likely to do more 
harm than aggressive enforcement, and to advocate a shift away from broad 
prescriptions of laissez-faire antitrust enforcement in digital platform 
markets. 
2. Mergers and Innovation 
Just as monopoly conduct can be examined for its effects on innovation, 
so too can mergers. A merger’s likely effects on innovation became an 
increasing focus in the 1990s.137 While often mentioned as a factor in merger 
review, it was not until 2004 that a merger decision arguably rested solely on 
innovation considerations.138 The FTC’s review of Genzyme’s acquisition of 
Novazyme focused on “whether the merged firm was likely to have a 
reduced incentive to invest in R&D, and also whether it was likely to have 
the ability to conduct R&D more successfully.”139 The investigation did not 
address the usual horizontal merger issues of price or output effects and 
ultimately resulted in the FTC’s decision to allow the consummated merger 
to stand.140 Most importantly, the analysis of innovation effects did not rely 
on the structural presumptions that usually apply to price effects, largely 
because the shaky presumptions that conventionally link price competition 
to concentration levels work even less well to link innovation to concentra-
tion levels.141 As a result, the FTC undertook a detailed, fact-intensive 
inquiry of the particular circumstances of the transaction to reach its 
determination that innovation would be helped more than hindered by the 
transaction.142 
Several features of an innovation-based approach to mergers are attrac-
tive for transactions involving digital platforms. For one, an analysis that 
 
137 See generally Katz & Shelanski, supra note 25, at 81. 
138 Id. 
139 Genzyme Corp./Novazyme Pharm., Inc., No. 021-0026, at 6 (FTC Jan. 13, 2004) (State-
ment of Chairman Timothy J. Muris) [hereinafter Muris Statement], available at http://www. 
ftc.gov/os/2004/01/murisgenzymestmt.pdf. 
140 Id. at 1. 
141 Katz & Shelanski, supra note 25, at 16-24. 
142 Muris Statement, supra note 139, at 2-6. 
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expressly takes into account how a merger might affect innovation expands 
the kinds of merger benefits an agency will consider. The FTC took this 
approach in the Genzyme/Novazyme merger143 and has continued to do so 
in appropriate merger cases, as the discussion below of the proposed 
Thoratec/HeartWare merger will show. Where the necessary data is 
available, agencies can assess innovation effects of a merger through an 
effects-based approach that does not rely on the market definition—a 
difficult approach in technologically dynamic markets.144 Such an examina-
tion looks instead at whether the transaction is likely to enhance or inhibit 
the merging firms’ incentives and abilities to invest in developing and 
introducing new products. When available, the innovation-based merger 
analysis allows for welfare-enhancing enforcement even when there is 
significant uncertainty about what products will be relevant in the future 
and what their market structures will be. As the following example illustrates, 
however, the necessary evidence will not always be available for this analysis.  
Thoratec’s proposed merger with HeartWare, which the FTC blocked in 
2009, provides a good illustration of how an innovation-based merger 
analysis might work.145 Thoratec made the only government-approved left 
ventricular assist device (LVAD) in the U.S. market.146 LVADs are surgically 
implantable blood pumps that sustain patients who suffer from end-stage 
heart failure.147 HeartWare was a potential entrant whose own LVAD 
product was well into the FDA approval process and promised several 
advantages over Thoratec’s LVAD.148 A potential benefit of the merger was 
that Thoratec’s experience and distribution channels might help overcome 
remaining regulatory and marketing hurdles and enable the merged firm to 
get HeartWare’s LVAD to patients sooner. Against this potential efficiency 
benefit was the issue that Chairman Muris identified in Genzyme149: Would 
a post-merger Thoratec have as strong an incentive as an independent 
HeartWare to bring the product to market? Weighing these competing 
 
143 See Katz & Shelanski, supra note 25, at 81-85 (discussing the FTC’s analysis of the Genzyme-
Novazyme merger). 
144 See supra Section I.B. 
145 Complaint, Thoratec Corp. & HeartWare Int’l, Inc., No. 9339 (FTC July 28, 2009), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9339/090730thorateadminccmpt.pdf. 
146 Id. at 1-2. 
147 Id. at 1. 
148 Id. at 2. 
149 Statement, supra note 139, at 6. 
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factors, the Commission issued a complaint to block the merger, which the 
parties subsequently abandoned.150 
The complaint alleged that (1) competition from HeartWare had already 
forced Thoratec to innovate;151 (2) no other firms working to develop 
LVADs posed as strong a competitive threat to Thoratec as HeartWare;152 
and (3) upon receiving FDA approval, HeartWare would take significant 
market share from Thoratec.153 Taken together, these allegations led to the 
conclusion that by acquiring HeartWare, Thoratec would face less competi-
tive pressure to bring the new product to market. With information about 
prices, margins, and likely diversion ratio, one can quantify this effect and 
compare the pre- and post-merger incentives to bring HeartWare’s product 
to market.154 
Section 6.4 of the 2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines describes this 
general approach.155 When an incumbent introduces a new product that 
rivals its preexisting product, some customers will abandon the incumbent’s 
preexisting product for this new product. This “cannibalization” effect 
discourages incumbents from introducing new products. Suppose that Firm 
1 produces product A and that a rival, Firm 2, is developing innovation B, 
which will compete with A. If introduced, product B will draw a fraction d of 
its sales from customers who would otherwise buy A (thus d is the diversion 
ratio). Let MA be the profit margin that Firm 1 earns on incremental sales of 
A, and let MB be the profit margin that (for simplicity) either firm would 
earn on sales of B once introduced.  
Firm 2’s profit from introducing B and selling Q units exceeds its cost, 
C2, of product introduction if MBQ ≥ C2. But if the firms have merged and 
no other entry is imminent, the merged firm will find it profitable to 
introduce B only if [MB - dMA]Q ≥ CM, where CM is the merged firm’s cost 
of product introduction. If dMA is not much less than MB, then the merged 
firm may well find the introduction much less profitable than would an 
independent Firm 2, even if the merged firm’s cost of introduction is 
considerably lower. This example illustrates how a merger can dramatically 
affect the incentives to introduce an innovative product—what we might 
call downward innovation pressure (DIP).  
 
150 Justine Varieur Cadet, Thoratec Abandons $282M Purchase of HeartWare After FTC Block, 
HEALTHIMAGING (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.healthimaging.com/topics/diagnostic-imaging/thoratec-
abandons-282m-purchase-heartware-after-ftc-block. 
151 Complaint, supra note 145, at 2. 
152 Id. at 4. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 21, § 6.4.  
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The DIP comes from the fact that, if a monopolist innovates (as previ-
ously discussed) it will cannibalize its own sales. This cannibalization deters 
innovation and narrows the conditions under which the monopolist will 
invest in a next-generation product. A monopolist might still innovate if it 
can increase demand by improving the product, reduce costs to improve 
per-unit profits, or reduce demand elasticity in order to charge a higher per-
unit price. Under some conditions, a monopolist might also be able to 
coordinate prices of the new and incumbent products in such a way as to 
make the new product more profitable than if it introduced the product on a 
standalone basis.156 A monopolist will not, however, undertake all innova-
tions that a new entrant or a firm facing competition would find profitable 
to invest in, and therein lies a potential cost in allowing mergers that 
eliminate or substantially reduce competition where innovation is important. 
This example—which can be generalized with some additional complexity 
beyond the case of merger to monopoly and can be extended to vertical 
mergers—demonstrates how a transaction can lead to very different pre- 
and post-merger probabilities of the introduction of an innovative product. 
Firms claiming the need for an emergency merger will emphasize the 
greater capability of Firm 1 than of the struggling Firm 2 to bring the new 
product to market. But claims about capability should not obscure a transac-
tion’s effects on incentives to exercise that capability.  
It is certainly the case that the analysis described above will not be pos-
sible in all, or even many, cases. But experience has shown that where it is 
possible, this analysis provides a tool for the agencies to use in appropriate 
circumstances. Moreover, the Google/AdMob merger demonstrates that in 
some cases the relevant analysis can be undertaken using documentary 
evidence rather than quantitative economic data. It was widely reported, 
and Google itself acknowledged, that it was buying AdMob to accelerate the 
growth of its mobile advertising business—Google was acquiring technology 
it would otherwise have built itself.157 Blocking the transaction would have 
forced Google to innovate, and would have left AdMob with further 
incentive to keep developing its own technology. It therefore became the 
parties’ burden to show either that the merger would have offsetting 
efficiencies in the form of producing better technology sooner or that there 
were enough other sources of innovation in mobile advertising that the 
consolidation should not be viewed as reducing technological progress.  
 
156 Yongmin Chen & Marius Schwartz, Product Innovation Incentives: Monopoly vs. Competition 
20 (Dep’t of Econ., Georgetown Univ., Working Paper No. 09-02, 2010), available at http:// 
www8.georgetown.edu/departments/economics/pdf/902.pdf. 
157 See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text. 
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As with the innovation-based analysis of monopoly conduct, innovation-
based analysis of mergers will not be feasible in all investigations. In some 
cases, the sources of innovation are simply too hard to discern and a transac-
tion’s effect on the parties’ incentives to develop and deploy new technology 
cannot be judged. But in other cases, focusing on innovation is illuminating 
and could reveal anticompetitive effects that would be overlooked by 
traditional analyses or by erring on the side of underenforcement. The 
evidence of a merger’s effects on innovation incentives could be quanti-
tative, as in Thoratec/HeartWare, or documentary, as in Google/AdMob. 
When evidence of either kind is sufficiently strong, competition authorities 
should challenge a merger that would likely reduce innovation. Through 
such challenges, merger scrutiny can promote innovation even in technolog-
ically dynamic markets.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has attempted to identify some of the important economic 
characteristics of digital platforms and to discuss their implications for 
competition policy. To date, the debate over antitrust enforcement on the 
Internet has been between those who argue for a systematic retreat from 
intervention because of the fast changing, technologically dynamic market 
environment, and those who argue for aggressive regulation of currently 
dominant platforms. I share many of the skeptics’ concerns about the 
conventional competition enforcement against digital platforms, but I also 
think there can be significant and avoidable welfare costs from under-
enforcement errors in high-technology markets. I, therefore, agree that 
competition policy should be cautious in addressing digital platforms, but I 
argue that antitrust enforcement should also change in ways that make 
competition analysis more suitable to the characteristics of the Internet and 
its associated industries. I try to contribute to that process of change by 
discussing how a further shift in emphasis from price and output effects to 
information and innovation effects could alter the error cost balance and 
reduce costly mistakes of underenforcement. I have tried to explain why 
these changes are particularly important for competition policy in digital 
platform markets and to offer some preliminary, specific directions that 
those changes, and future research in competition policy, might take.  
